Risk-Aversion and Social Mobility: The Impossibility of Order-Preserving Income Redistributions by Leif Danziger & Heinrich Ursprung






Phone: +49 (89) 9224-1410/1425
Fax: +49 (89) 9224-1409
http://www.CESifo.de
RISK AVERSION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY:




Working Paper No. 321CESifo Working Paper No. 321
July 2000
RISK AVERSION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY:
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ORDER-PRESERVING
INCOME REDISTRIBUTIONS
Abstract
The traditional criticism notwithstanding, we show that social mobility
can, in principle, explain political income redistributions.
Nonetheless, the social-mobility argument for redistribution is not
satisfactory, as actual transition probabilities are not consistent with
order-preserving redistributions.
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In most, if not all, democratic countries income is unequally distributed with the mean income
substantially larger than the median income. Why do the poor, who outnumber the rich, then not
expropriate the rich via the political process?
1 Various solutions to this "paradox of
redistribution" have been advanced in the literature.
2 Answers in line with the political-economy
approach to analyzing policy decisions comprise (i) the  incentive argument which argues that
excessive income taxation would reduce the labor supply of the most productive segment of the
population and thereby the tax base (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Epple and Romer, 1991), and
furthermore, via external effects, thwart the potential for innovation and endogenous growth
(Perotti, 1993); (ii) the economic-power argument which maintains that the upper class bribes the
middle class into a coalition against the lower class (Breyer and Ursprung, 1998); (iii) the
transaction-cost argument which accounts for post-redistribution differences in incomes by
frictions arising in the political process (Roemer, 1998); and (iv) the socio-economic argument
which explains the reluctance of the middle class to advocate large-scale income redistribution
schemes by their concern to sustain their distinctive social status (Corneo and Grüner, 2000).
Another popular political-economy explanation of the "paradox of redistribution" is based
on the  social-mobility argument: even people who would benefit from large-scale income
redistribution in the short run may vote against it because they believe that they or their
descendants have a fair chance of moving up the income hierarchy in the future. Piketty (1995),
for example, presents a model, which portrays social mobility in an environment in which voters'
decisions are determined by their endogenously formed beliefs about the relative importance of
effort and luck in economic prosperity. Harms and Zink (2000) resort to the standard assumption
that voters base their political decisions on expected income maximization, but model income
changes as the outcome of rational individual investment decisions. The basic social-mobility2
argument, however, has not fared well in the literature. The fundamental objection usually raised
against the argument runs as follows: "If one's perceived likelihood of having any given level of
wealth equals the proportion of the population at that wealth level, then one's expected wealth
equals the average wealth. With risk-aversion, the expected utility of the wealth lottery is then
necessarily less than that of having the average existing wealth level with certainty." (Putterman,
1997, p. 370). "So voting against wealth taxation to preserve the possible good fortune of one's
dynasty in the future cannot be part of a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium..." (Putterman
et al., 1998, p. 895).
While we agree with the negative assessment of the social-mobility argument, we do so
for a different reason. In our opinion, the standard objection is not valid since it presupposes that
voters make their decisions behind a veil of complete uncertainty. If one concedes that political
decisions are made for the not too distant future, it is more realistic to consider an imperfect veil
of uncertainty with social mobility following a pattern with well-known transition probabilities.
Under these circumstances, the representative-agent line of reasoning breaks down and the
political process would not bring about complete income equalization. The majority could
maximize its expected income by expropriating all income from the minorities, but with risk
aversion, even a selfish majority would not want to leave the minorities without income. The
reason is that each member of the present majority knows that he runs the risk of later becoming
part of a minority and therefore being expropriated. However, we show that with realistic
transition probabilities, the social-mobility argument cannot generate a post-redistribution income
distribution that preserves the order of the original income distribution. Specifically, in order for a
high-income individual’s post-redistributive income to exceed that of a majority middle-income
individual, a high-income individual must have a higher probability of becoming a middle-
income individual than a middle-income individual has of remaining a middle-income individual.3
This is inconsistent with the stylized facts about transition probabilities. Empirical studies on
social mobility clearly indicate that the degree of downward mobility from the upper strata of
society is less than what is required for an order-preserving income redistribution.
3
In the next section we present our model of the social mobility explanation of the
"redistribution paradox" within a framework of an incomplete veil of uncertainty,
4 and we
formally prove that with realistic transition probabilities, order-preserving income redistributions
are impossible.
2.  Social Mobility behind an Imperfect Veil of Uncertainty
Consider an economy in which there is no production and a population consisting of a unit
continuum of individuals. Time is discrete. Each individual receives an endowment income of
either x l, x m, or x h of a non-storable good in each period, where 0￿xl<xm<xh. Hence, the
individuals who receive x l belong to the low-income group, the individuals who receive x m
belong to the middle-income group, and the individuals who receive xh belong to the high-income
group. The transition probabilities are denoted by p.., so that e.g. plm is the probability that an
individual who receives x l in one period will receive x m in the following period. The transition
probabilities are independent across individuals and over time.
For simplicity, assume plh=phl=0, i.e., an individual does not move directly from the low-
income group in one period to the high-income group in the following period, and vice versa. The
equilibrium sizes of the three income groups are then
Sl=phmpml/D, Sm=phmplm/D, Sh=pmhplm/D,            (1)
where4
D=phmpml+phmplm+pmhplm.
We assume that plm, pml, pmh, phm>0 so that there are individuals in all three income groups, and
that phmpml>phmplm+pmhplm so that the middle-income individuals constitute the majority.
Individuals have no access to borrowing or lending, and there is no private insurance. The
individuals' utility in each period depends on only their consumption in that period, and they are
risk averse. If c denotes the consumption in one period, the utility is U(c), where U'>0 and U''<0.
We assume that U'(0)=￿.
In each period the individuals vote for a scheme of redistributive taxation for the next
period. The taxation must satisfy the redistribution constraint
tlSl+tmSm+thSh=0,           (2)
where tl, tm, and t h are the redistributive taxes (positive or negative) levied on individuals with
endowment xl, xm, and xh, respectively.
The majority has the power to enact its most preferred taxation scheme. The individuals
with the current endowment income of x m, which constitute the majority, therefore set the
redistributive taxes for the next period so as to maximize their own expected utility of
consumption which is
pmlU(xl+tl)+pmmU(xm+tm)+pmhU(xh+th).           (3)
Maximizing expected utility (3) of the members of the middle-income group subject to the
redistribution constraint (2), one obtains the unique majority choice of the redistributive taxes
given by the redistribution constraint together with
(pml/Sl)U'(xl+tl)= (pmm/Sm)U'(xm+tm)= (pmh/Sh)U'(xh+th).5
Thus, the redistributive taxes equalize the fraction of the current majority members that will be in
each of the income groups in the next period multiplied by the marginal utility of the
consumption of a member of this income group. Using equations (1), this condition becomes
plmU'(xl+tl)=pmmU'(xm+tm)=phmU'(xh+th),           (4)
showing that the transition probability of becoming a middle-class individual in the next period
multiplied by the marginal utility of an individual’s current consumption is the same for all
income groups.
Three aspects of the political-economic equilibrium deserve to be emphasized:
First, the political process does not generally equalize post-tax incomes. A complete
equalization presupposes that plm=pmm=phm  and would therefore only occur if the probability of
becoming a middle-class individual is the same for all income groups.
Second, although the majority has the power to do so, it will not expropriate all of the
income received by the minority low-income group (or, for that matter, the minority high-income
group) and leave that group without any consumption, i.e. the majority chooses x l+tl>0. The
reason is that an individual who receives xm and belongs to the majority in this period, may get x l
and belong to the low-income minority in the next period. Since the marginal utility at zero
consumption is infinity, no one would want to run the risk of getting into a situation in which he
would end up with no consumption at all in the next period, no matter how small the likelihood of
this happening would be. The majority therefore votes for less than full expropriation of the low-
income minority's income, and hence pays an insurance premium by choosing a smaller expected
consumption for themselves in the next period than they could obtain with full expropriation. In
this way, members of the current majority insure themselves against the outcome in which they
become part of the low-income minority in the next period. In fact, if x l is sufficiently small as6
compared to x m and x h, the majority even chooses to redistribute income toward the low-income
group.
Third, an increase in the endowment income of either the majority group or one of the
minority groups leads to an increase in the consumption of all three groups. This is because the
consumption must necessarily increase for one of the groups, and condition (4) entails that the
consumption must then increase for all groups. In fact, the consumption pattern of the three
groups is independent of the original distribution of total endowment income. To see this, let
E￿xlSl+xmSm+xhSh denote total endowments in the economy, and f l￿(xl+tl)/E, f m￿(xm+tm)/E,
fh￿(xh+th)/E denote the proportion of E obtained by an individual in the low-, middle-, and high-
income groups after redistribution. The redistribution constraint and condition (4) can then be
rewritten as
flSl+fmSm+fhSh=1,   and
plmU'(flE)=pmmU'(fmE)=phmU'(fhE),
which shows that the consumption pattern depends on total endowment income, but not on its
original distribution.
In order for the political redistribution process to preserve the order of disposable
incomes, i.e., in order for f l<fm<fh, the transition probability of becoming a middle-income
individual in the next period must increase with the current income – it must be the case that
plm<pmm<phm. In other words, a current middle-income individual must be more likely than a
current low-income individual to receive a middle income in the next period, but less likely than a
current high-income individual to receive a middle income in the next period. The latter
restriction is not, however, borne out in the real world. Empirical studies on social mobility
indicate that the degree of mobility at the top (and bottom) of the earnings distribution is7
significantly lower than at the broad middle range of the distribution (Atkinson et al., 1992, p.
76), which in the context of our model means that p mm<phh=1-phm. Since the time span
characterized by policy persistence is rather short and therefore pmm>1/2Yphm<pmm, the stylized
facts of social mobility are inconsistent with an order-preserving redistribution. A recent study on
labor earnings in Germany by Trede (1997) provides a rough estimate of the order of magnitude
involved. Identifying the middle-income group with the second, third, and fourth quintiles, the
average two-year transition probabilities p mm and p hm are approximately 84% and 32%,
respectively.
5 The difference of over 50% between the two transition probabilities indicates that
pmm will exceed phm even if the period of policy persistence is substantially longer than two years.
3.  Conclusion
Social mobility cannot by itself explain the “paradox of redistribution”. Only in conjunction with,
for example, the incentive argument may it be possible for social-mobility considerations to
contribute to a satisfactory positive theory of political redistribution. The reason for the
insufficiency of the social-mobility explanation is, however, not the traditional criticism that is
predicated on the counterfactual assumption of a complete veil of uncertainty at the time of policy
decision. Rather, the reason is that under the realistic assumption of an incomplete veil of
uncertainty, actual transition probabilities would give rise to a pattern of redistribution, which is
not order-preserving.8
References
Atkinson, A., F. Bourguignon and C. Morrisson, 1992, Empirical studies of earnings mobility,
Fundamentals of pure and applied economics 52 (Harwood Academic Publishers, Chur).
Bénabou, R. and E. Ok, 1998, Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: The POUM
hypothesis, NBER Working Paper No. 6795.
Breyer, F. and H. Ursprung, 1998, Are the rich too rich to be expropriated? Economic power and
the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution, Public Choice 94, 135-156.
Corneo, G. and H.P. Grüner, 2000, Social limits to redistribution, American Economic Review
(forthcoming).
Epple, D. and T. Romer,  1991, Mobility and redistribution, Journal of Poltical Economy 99, 828-
858.
Falkinger, J., 1999, Social instability and redistribution of income, European Journal of Political
Economy 15, 35-51.
Harms, P. and S. Zink, 2000, Invest, expropriate, or wait? Expected income and the demand for
redistribution, Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
Meltzer, A. and S. Richard, 1981, A rational theory of the size of government, Journal of Political
Economy 52, 914-927.
Perotti, R., 1993, Political equilibrium, income distribution, and growth, Review of Economic
Studies 60, 755-776.
Piketty, T., 1995, Social mobility and redistributive politics, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110,
551-584.
Putterman, L., 1997, Why have the rabble not redistributed the wealth? On the stability of
democracy and unequal property, in: J. Roemer, eds., Property relations, incentives and
welfare. Proceedings of a Conference held in Barcelona, Spain, by the International
Economic Association St. Martin's Press, New York) 359-389.
Putterman, L., J. Roemer and J. Silverstre, 1998, Does egalitarianism have a future? Journal of
Economic Literature 36, 861-902.
Roemer, J., 1998, Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: An old argument in new garb,
Journal of Public Economics 70, 399-424.
Trede, M., 1997,  Statistische  Messung  der  Einkommensmobilität ( Vandenhoek &  Ruprecht,
Göttingen).9
Wessels, J., 1993, Redistribution from a constitutional perspective, Constitutional  Political
Economy 4, 425-448.10
Notes
1 A related question is to what extent the poor can obtain income redistribution if they are
politically powerless but in a position to disrupt the social stability in society (Falkinger, 1999).
2 See Putterman (1997) for a survey.
3 See Atkinson et al. (1992) for a survey of the empirical literature on earnings mobility.
4 A similar presentation is found in Bénabou and Ok (1998) and a related one, using a normative
constitutional set-up, in Wessels (1993).
5 These figures refer to gross labor incomes earned by males in the West German  states in the
1983-1993 period (Trede, 1997, p. 126).